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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON LABORATORY AND FIELD EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS
BY
GUANLIN GAO
AUGUST 2015
Committee Chair: Dr. James Cox
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation explores what factors and institutions influence individual decision
making and their economic impacts on the society, using approaches of laboratory and field
experiments. The first essay addresses the effect of communication on cooperation. The
second essay explores various types of public recognition, and their impacts on individual
donation. The third essay studies how principals use their time in K-12 schools and the
potential impact on student and school outcomes.
The first essay employs a laboratory experiment including three factors in human inter-
actions, a noisy environment, indefinite length of interactions, and various levels of com-
munication, to study what factors make individuals more cooperative. Results show that
subjects are less cooperative in a noisy environment, and communication via fixed messages
is not a remedy for the low cooperation rate in this noisy environment. However, commu-
nication via free messages leads to more cooperations, and it maintains cooperation rate at
a high level over time.
The second essay is a joint work with Yefeng Chen, Haoran He, and Jun Luo. We
conduct a field experiment to investigate how public recognition influences individual char-
itable giving. We design five treatments with distinct public recognition schemes and vary
the timing when we offer opportunities of public recognition. Results show that both dona-
tion amount and participation rate are significantly higher when we mandate recognition.
However, public recognition offered before donation crowds out small donations and thus
lowers the participation rate. We claim that public recognition is a “double-edged sword”
on individual charitable giving.
The third essay is a joint work with Mary Mira. We conduct a principal motion study
in Fulton County, Georgia and shadow 30 school principals from all levels of public K-12
schools for two work days. We link our observational data with student performance data
from state-wide standard scores. Results show that principals’ time spend on building and
maintaining school culture and school climate, as well as evaluating teachers and school staff
are most positively related to student performance.
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Introduction
This dissertation explores what factors and institutions influence individual decision
making and their economic impacts on the society, using approaches of laboratory and field
experiments. The first essay addresses the effect of communication on cooperation. The
second essay explores various types of public recognition, and their impacts on individual
donation. The third essay studies how principals use their time in K-12 schools and the
potential impact on student and school outcomes.
The first essay aims to understand what factors influence individuals’ decisions when
their private interests conflict with mutual benefits. This paper employs a laboratory ex-
periment that includes three factors in human interactions: noisy environment, indefinite
length of interaction, and various levels of communication. Results of this study show that
subjects are less cooperative in a noisy environment, and communication via fixed messages
is not a remedy for the low cooperation rate in this noisy environment. Although free
message delivers similar contents of information on subject strategies, it leads to a distinct
outcome compared to communicating through fixed messages. On the aggregated level,
subjects are 32.2% more likely to cooperate with their partners when they can communicate
freely, compared to no communication. Besides significantly increases cooperation between
subjects, free communication also maintains the cooperation rate at a high level over time.
The second essay is a joint work with Yefeng Chen, Haoran He, and Jun Luo. We
conducted a field experiment to investigate how public recognition influences individual
charitable giving. We designed five treatments with distinct public recognition schemes and
varied the timing when we offered opportunities of public recognition. Results of this study
show that both the donation amount and participation rate are significantly higher when
we mandated recognition. However, public recognition offered before donation crowds out
small donations and thus lowers the participation rate. Therefore we claim that public
recognition is a “double-edged sword” on individual charitable giving. This study aims to
raise awareness of the proper use of public recognition as an approach to increase donation
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in charitable fund-raising. It also provides evidence on individual behavior of charitable
giving outside the laboratory.
The third essay is a joint work with Mary Mira. We conducted a principal motion study
in Fulton County, Georgia and shadowed 30 school principals from all levels of public K-12
schools for two work days. We logged and coded principals’ activities into 10 broad categories
including instructional leadership, school climate, planning and assessment, organizational
management, human resource management, teacher/staff evaluation, professionalism, com-
munication and community relations, personal, and travel. We linked these observational
data with student performance data from state-wide Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests
(CRCT) and End of Course Tests (ECOT) scores in math and language. Results of this
study show that (1) principal’s leadership role contains multiple aspects, (2) principals’ time
use varies among different school levels and school characteristics, and (3) principals’ time
spend on building and maintaining school culture and school climate, as well as evaluating
teachers and school staff have strong positive relations with student performance. These
results suggest that principals should focus their work on building and maintaining a good
school culture and school climate, as well as providing opportunities in school employee
development, which will ultimately leads to better student academic outcomes.
On the whole, this dissertation employs laboratory and field experiments to study real
world phenomenons. Results of this dissertation aim to provide practical insights for indi-
viduals as well as for policy makers.
2
Chapter 1
The Power of Words: A Laboratory
Experiment on Communication and
Cooperation
1.1 Introduction
In many situations, a central feature of human interaction is the conflict between co-
operation, which creates mutual benefits, and individual opportunistic behavior, which is
motivated by private interests. This conflict generates losses in the total social welfare if
individuals choose to pursue their private gains. A classic example of this social dilemma
is the prisoner’s dilemma, where defect is the dominant strategy. There are a number of
studies searching for ways to encourage cooperation, desiring to increase the total benefit
for individuals and groups.
This paper employs a laboratory experiment to study how communication, noise and
the length of interaction influence individual cooperation. The purpose of this study is to
seek an efficient way to increase the gains from cooperation via low-cost communication.
It aims to answer three research questions: (1) how cooperative individuals are in a noisy
3
environment, (2) does the level of communication affect individual decision on cooperation,
and (3) do individuals learn to cooperate over time. This research contributes to the current
literature by extending prisoner’s dilemma game to include three main features of human
interaction: noisy environment, stochastic length of interaction, and various levels of com-
munication. First, in the noisy environment, what an individual intends to do may not be
the actual outcome. There is a noise variant, which is a probability of nature, that makes
the real outcome deviate from individual decision. Second, the indefinite length of interac-
tions implies that subjects interact with other individuals for a period of time, but they do
not know when exactly the entire interaction ends. This is implemented by having a ran-
dom termination on each round of the interaction. Third, different levels of communication
are implemented in the treatments of this experiment. In the baseline No-message treat-
ment, subjects cannot communicate with anyone during the game. In the Fixed-message
treatment, subjects have the option to exchange messages with their partners about their
intentions and future moves. In the Free-message treatment, subjects can chat with their
partners freely.
Results of this paper show that people are less cooperative in an environment with noise.
Communication on intentions and future moves through fixed messages is not a remedy
for low cooperation in this noisy environment. Cooperation rate in the Fixed-message
treatment is not statistically different from that in the No-message treatment. However, free
communication significantly increases cooperation between subjects, and it maintains the
cooperation rate at a high level over time. The average cooperation rate in the Free-message
treatment is 55.6%, and this is significantly higher compared to 24.6% in the No-message
treatment and 24.5% in the Fixed-message treatment. Although communication is a “cheap-
talk” per se, subjects are 32.2% more likely to cooperate with their partners when they can
communicate freely with each other. Besides, subjects learn to coorperate over time. They
adept their behaviors according to results from previous rounds, and they carry experience
from the preivous game onto later ones.
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature. Section
3 describes the experiment design. Section 4 presents the experiment results. Section 5
concludes. Experiment instructions, subject demographic data, selected subjects’ messages
and self-reported strategies are presented in the appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
One approach to increase individual cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game is to
increase the length of the game from one round to multiple rounds. Kreps et al. 1982 showed
that people are more likely to cooperate in repeated games, since cooperation maximizes po-
tential gains from future interactions. Evolutionary game theory further modifies the game
length to include infinite number of rounds. According to Osborne and Rubinstein 1994,
the game is infinite because players do not know when it ends exactly. Bó 2005 provides
supporting evidence from a laboratory experiment. He concluded that by having a random
termination rule, the possibility of future interaction led to more cooperation between sub-
jects. Additionally, Bo and Fréchette 2011 found that subjects learned to cooperate over
time in infinite games, especially when cooperation was a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium and risk dominance. Fudenberg et al. 2012 introduced a noise variant into the infinite
prisoner’s dilemma game. They found that in the noisy environment, subjects were more
patient and lenient towards defection.
There is a relatively small body of literature that studies infinite prisoner’s dilemma
game. A few of them study different implementations of the random termination rule in
laboratory experiments. For example, Normann and Wallace 2012 found that termina-
tion rules had no significant effect on average subject cooperation, although different rules
might lead to diverse subject end-game behaviors. Fréchette and Yuksel 2013 found that
in random-terminated repeated games, subjects were more willing to cooperate compared
to in finite repeated games with payoff discounting. This paper implemented the random
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termination rule by using payoff discounting followed by a random termination. Accord-
ing to Fréchette and Yuksel 2013, such method generates a relatively low cooperation rate
compared to other implementations when cooperation is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Also, subject cooperation rate is relatively consistent over time in this game setting.
There are a number of studies aiming to promote fairness and efficiency in social wel-
fare via communication. For example, Isaac and Walker 1988 found that communication
significantly reduced free-riding behaviors in public good contribution games. They con-
cluded that communication helped providing information and building credibilities, and it
generated a non-reversible learning process. Recent works such as Xiao and Houser 2005
and Xiao and Houser 2009 found that in the one-shot dictator game, first movers chose
fair distributions more often when second movers were able to send an ex post message to
the first movers. Duffy and Feltovich 2006 compared individual action and message sent
in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, and they concluded that messages aligned with
actions led to better outcomes while messages contradicted with actions led to less efficient
outcomes. Ben-Ner and Putterman 2009 introduced various types of communication in one-
shot trust and investment games and found that ex ante communication promoted trust
and trust worthiness. With communication, both truster and trustee favored proposals that
were more fair and efficient over unequal ones. Researches show that communication also
contributes to economic efficiency and fairness in repeated games. For example, Cooper
and Lightle 2013 found that messages exchanged between employees and employers helped
them choosing a better contract. They concluded that communication provided informa-
tion and facilitated learning between subjects. This learning process even persisted after
communication had stopped. Tullock 1999, Brosig 2002, and Cho 2013 studied the effect
of communication on individual cooperation in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games without
noise. Results of these studies showed that generally communication encouraged cooperation
and retained subject cooperation rate at higher levels. In such an environment with zero
noise, subjects either have no incentive to lie, or the cost associated with lying is relatively
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high since false communication can be easily detected and punished. However, subject are
expected to behave differently in an environment with noise (Fudenberg et al. 2012). This
paper includes a noise variant in the laboratory environment.
1.3 Experiment Design and Procedure
This experiment uses a standard two-person prisoner’s dilemma game with the strategy
set of Si = {Cooperate,Defect} for subject i. The static Nash equilibrium in the stage
game is to always defect. The stage game is referred to as a round, and the supergame
is referred to as a match. In this experiment, subjects play several matches, and each
match contains multiple rounds. In each round, subjects are asked to choose between A,
the cooperative choice, and B, the non-cooperative choice. This experiment adopts neutral
language in order to avoid any framing effect. The payoffs associated with subject choices
in each round are as in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Subject payoffs in each round
A B
A 0.6, 0.6 0, 1
B 1, 0 0.2, 0.2
At the beginning of this experiment, subjects are randomly paired into groups of two.
The pairing stays the same during a match. After each match, subjects are re-paired with
different individuals to play for another match. Upon subjects’ completion of all the matches,
the experimenter randomly selects one match in order to determine subject payments. Sub-
jects are paid $10 for participation, in addition to what they made in the randomly selected
match. The exchange rate is 1 experimental point = 3 US dollars. Subjects fill out a post
experiment questionnaire, which includes questions on subject demographics and strategies
they used in the game.
This experiment adds three features to the prisoner’s dilemma game: a noise variant, a
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random termination rule, and various levels of communication. The purpose of this experi-
mental design is to include major components of human interactions. First, in the real world,
the outcomes that we observe are usually influenced by noise. For example, a team member
may argue that a technical problem prevented him from completing the group project on
time. It might be true that his intention was to finish the work, but some unforeseen forces
of nature such as a broken computer prevented him from completing the work on time. At
other times, intentions that are motivated by self-interests may lead to outcomes that are
beneficial to the group. The noise variant captures these perturbations caused by nature
that make outcomes deviate from one’s intentions. Another aspect of human interaction
is that we live in a relatively small world, and we interact with the same person for a cer-
tain period of time. This interaction may end at a certain point of time, but neither party
knows when it will end exactly. This indefinite length of interaction between individuals is
implemented by a random termination rule in this experiment design. Subjects know that
they will interact with one person at a time for a certain number of rounds, but they do
not know when each interaction ends exactly. Also, this paper includes communication in
the experiment design as a third feature from human interaction. This is implemented by
employing various levels of communication in different treatments. The following discusses
the experimental design of this paper in details.
1. Noise
The noise parameter  is defined as the probability of a subject’s intended move being
altered by nature, and  = 12.5%. In each round of the game, there is a 12.5% chance that
a subject’s choice is not implemented. In other words, 1−  is the chance of realization. For
example, if a subject chooses option A, 87.5% of the chance option A will be realized; for a
12.5% chance, option B will be realized. This probablity is independent for each individual
in every round of a match. Subjects know whether their own choices have been implemented
or not; however, they do not know if the their partner’s choices have been implemented.
In other words, subjects are only informed of the realized outcomes, without having any
8
information on the other party’s intentions. Table 1.2 shows the expected subject payoffs
in a round with noise. In the stage game with noise, defecting is still the equilibrium.
Table 1.2: Expected subject payoffs in each round with noise
A B
A 0.572, 0.572 0.103,0.853
B 0.853, 0.103 0.272, 0.272
The methodological advantage of including a noise variant is that it allows us to observe
diverse strategies. As Fudenberg et al. 2012 claim, we can observe the counter factual of
what could have happened if one party has a trembling hand. The practical advantage of
including a noise variant is that such design is close to the real world, which helps us better
understand how individuals behave outside the laboratory setting.
This experiment design also includes two treatments without noise, where  = 0. One of
these treatments is No-message without noise (No msg. no noise), and the other treatment
is Free-message without noise (Free msg. no noise). Except the value of , all other features
are the same in these two treatments compared to their counterpart treatments.
2. Random termination rule
In each match, subjects play a total number of N +X rounds. N denotes the number of
fixed rounds, and N = 8. X denotes the number of indefinite rounds, and X is determined
by a continuation rate of δ = 7/8. In each match, subjects play at least 8 rounds, and after
the 8th round, whether there will be a following round depends on a probability of 7/8. δ is
the discounting factor in rounds 1 to 8, and it can be interpreted as the continuation rate
in round 9 and the following rounds.
To implement this random termination rule, a sequence of integers X1, X2, ..., X8 was
generated according to the continuation rate of δ = 7/8. The matches in this experiment
contain 8 +X1, 8 +X2, ..., 8 +X8 rounds from match 1 to match 8. I followed Fudenberg
et al. 2012 in the number generating process. The sequence of numbers generated was 7,
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5, 4, 4, 15, 5, 10, and 6. Therefore, each match contains 15, 13, 12, 12, 23, 13, 18, and 14
rounds, respectively. The average number of rounds is 15.
Subjects played all of the 8 matches in each treatment except in those treatments with
free communication. In those treatments with free communication, subjects played the first
6 matches, because each match took longer in this treatment. The average number of rounds
of the matches is 14.7 in the treatments with free communication.
3. Communication
This experiment includes five treatments with various levels of communication and noise.
In the baseline No-message treatment (No msg.), subjects are not allowed to communicate
with the other party at any time. In the Fixed-message treatment (Fixed msg.), subjects
can exchange one message with the other party at the beginning of each round. They can
select one out of the three predetermined messages: “I will choose A”, “I will choose B”, or
“I prefer not to send a message” to send to the other party. The selected message will be
delivered prior to subject decision. This gives subjects the chance to exchange information
on their intentions and future moves before making a decision in each round. In the Free-
message treatment (Free msg.), subjects can chat with the other party at any time during
the match via free-style messages. They have up to 60 seconds to communicate and reach
a decision in every round.
Subjects received full information on the noise level, the random termination rule, and
the level of communication in the experiment instructions before they started the game.
The experiment instructions can be found in Appendix A. Subjects had enough time to
read the instructions. After all subjects had finished reading, the experimenter verbally
summarized the instructions again before the experiment started. Other information was
available to subjects as well, such as their own intended choices, whether their choices were
implemented, the actual outcomes, one’s own and the other party’s earnings for the current
round and match. These information was presented to subjects on their computer screens.
Figure 1.1 provides a screenshot from a subject terminal in the Free-message treatment.
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Figure 1.1: Subject screenshot in the Free-message Treatment
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The purpose of this study is to understand what factors influence individual decisions
in their daily interactions with others, and to seek an efficient way to promote cooperation.
It aims to answer three research questions:
1. Are individuals less or more cooperative in a noisy environment?
2. Does communication promote cooperation?
3. Do subjects learn to cooperate over time?
1.4 Results
This experiment was conducted in the research laboratory of Experimental Economics
Center at Georgia State University in September 2014. A total of 158 subjects participated in
this experiment. All these participants were Georgia State undergraduate students recruited
campus-wide. This experiment was computer-programmed and conducted using the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were paid for whatever they earned in a randomly
selected match, plus a $10 participation fee. Subjects received cash payments immediately
after the experiment. Table 1.3 provides some basic information of the experiment.
Table 1.3: Summary information
# of Matches Rounds per match Subject earnings ($)
Subjects per session avg min max avg min max
No msg. 40 8 15 12 23 23.08 14.8 32.8
Fixed msg. 40 8 15 12 23 28.36 19.6 42.4
Free msg. 40 6 14.6 12 23 28.53 16.6 35.8
No msg. no noise 20 8 15 12 23 24.82 16.0 32.8
Free msg. no noise 18 6 14.6 12 23 46.40 28.6 51.4
A. General Descriptions of Behavior
Before answering the three research questions raised in the previous session, a general
description of subject behavior is provided to give readers a broad view of subject decisions
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in each of the treatments. The first two columns of Table 1.4 present subject cooperation
rate in the first round of the first match and in all rounds of the first match in each treatment.
Column 3 and 4 present subject cooperation rate in all the first rounds of all matches and
in all rounds of all the matches in each treatment. Subject cooperation rate is defined
as the percentage of the number of subjects who choose to cooperate over the number of
all subjects in a treatment. It is noticeable that subjects started the game with higher
levels of cooperation in all treatments. The cooperation rate decreased over time in all
treatments except in the treatments with free messages, regardless of the noise level. The
Free-message without noise treatment had the highest subject cooperation rate overall. The
Fixed-message treatment had the lowest cooperation rate both in the very first round of the
game and in all rounds of the game.
Figure 1.2 shows subject’s initial cooperation rate at the beginning of all the matches. We
can observe that in the Free-message treatment, more than half of the subjects started the
game with cooperation. This is about the same for subjects in the No-message treatment.
In general, subjects tended to be less cooperative in later matches as the game continued. In
the Fixed-message treatment, 40% of the subjects cooperated at the very beginning of the
game, and the cooperation rate fluctuated as the experiment continued. In the last match,
subjects started the game with a cooperation rate of 36% in both of the No-message and
Fixed-message treatments, compare to 70% in the Free-message treatment.
Figure 1.3 shows subject cooperation rate in the eighth rounds of all matches. In the
Free-message treatment, the cooperation rate remained at a higher level, and it increased
as the experiment continued. In the No-message and Free-message treatments, subject
cooperation rates fluctuated from 17% to 40%.
Figure 1.4, Figure 1.5, and Figure 1.6 provide more details on subject cooperation rate
in the No-message, Fixed-message, and Free-message treatments. Each match in these
treatments were divided into two phases. The first phase contains the first 8 rounds, and
the second phase contains the rest of the rounds of the match. The eighth round is used
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Table 1.4: Subject cooperation rate in all treatments
First match All matches
First round All rounds First round All rounds
No msg. 50.0 29.0 37.8 24.6
Fixed msg. 40.0 30.7 33.4 24.5
Free msg. 52.5 46.3 66.3 55.6
No msg. no noise 55.0 20.3 55 36.8
Free msg. no noise 72.2 74.1 82.2 81.9
Figure 1.2: 1st round cooperation rate by treatment
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as the threshold because subjects expected at least eight rounds in one match. After the
eighth round, the match may end at any time. Although this random termination rule
prevents end-game defections and encourages cooperating “under the shadow of the future”
(Bó 2005), results from the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that subject are less cooperative
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Figure 1.3: 8th round cooperation rate by treatment
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in the second phase in all treatments with noise. These results are significant at the 1%
level.
B. Are individuals less or more cooperative in a noisy environment?
Compare to in the environment without noise, subjects are less cooperative in the envi-
ronment with noise. The average cooperation rate in the No-message without noise treat-
ment is 36.8%, and this is significantly higher compared to 24.6% in the No-message with
noise treatment at 1% significance level. The average cooperation rate in the Free-message
without noise treatment is 81.9%, and this is significantly higher compared to 55.6% in the
Free-message with noise treatment at 1% significance level as well.
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Figure 1.4: Subject cooperation rate in the No-message treatment
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Figure 1.5: Subject cooperation rate in the Fixed-message treatment
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Figure 1.6: Subject cooperation rate in the Free-message treatment
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Results from a probit regression also confirm that subjects are less cooperative in the
environment with noise. I use the probit regression to include subject choice as dependent
variable, and treatments and subject characteristics as independent variables. The base-
line is the No-message with noise treatment. Results show that compared to the baseline
treatment, subjects are 10.2% more likely to cooperate in the No-message without noise
treatment, and this marginal increase is statistically significant at the 1% level. These
results are shown in row 3 of Table 1.5.
One explanation of why subjects are less cooperative in the noisy environment is because
individuals are more lenient towards defections in such an environment, compared to in the
environment without noise. Subjects do not immediately punish the other party when
they observe a defection in the previous round. Also, people are more likely to return to
cooperation once they observe the other party has cooperated in the previous round. These
phenomena are describes as “slow to anger, fast to forgive” in Fudenberg et al. 2012. In other
words, the noisy environment creates a benefit of doubt. Therefore, subjects are more likely
to defect in the noisy environment, taking the benefit of doubt to maximize their private
gains.
C. Does communication promote cooperation?
This research finds that only free communication has a positive impact on cooperation.
Subjects in the Free-message treatment cooperate significantly more compared to subjects in
the No-message treatment (p = 0.000) and Fixed -message treatment (p = 0.000). However,
subjects in the Fixed-message treatment do not cooperate more than subjects in the No-
message treatment (p = 0.679).
Table 1.5 shows that with free communication, subjects are 32.2% more likely to cooper-
ate compared to the baseline treatment where communication is not allowed. This treatment
effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, in the Fixed-message
treatment where subjects can communicate about their intentions and future moves, people
are only 1% more likely to cooperate compared to subjects in the No-message treatment,
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Table 1.5: Probit regression with subject choice as dependent variable
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Choice Marginal Effect
Fixed msg. 0.0312 0.00990
(0.0288) (0.00914)
Free msg. 0.861*** 0.322***
(0.0298) (0.0106)
No msg. no noise 0.296*** 0.102***
(0.0327) (0.0114)
Free msg. no noise 1.569*** 0.564***
(0.0440) (0.0124)
Male 0.110*** 0.0368***
(0.0238) (0.00798)
Age 0.00708** 0.00238**
(0.00349) (0.00117)
Econ 0.0985* 0.0221*
(0.0535) (0.0180)
Constant -0.921*** .
(0.0797) .
Observations 18,024 18,024
Baseline: No-message with noise treatment.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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and this is statistically insignificant. Therefore, sending and receiving fixed messages do
not significantly influence subject decisions on coopertation. These results are in line with
Cooper and Kuhn 2010, where the authors found that communication in limited message
space provided no credible threats to enforce coordination.
Communication has two roles in this experiment: (1) providing information on subject
intentions and future moves, and (2) creating relationships between individuals and reducing
social distance. The first role can be obtained by sending and receiving either fixed messages
or free messages. The second role is better realized by exchanging free messages. Compare
to communicating via short and aloof fixed messages, free chat gives subjects the chance
to greet and acknowledge each other, and this helps building trust and trustworthiness
between subjects. Communication in both the Fixed-message and Free-message treatments
is cheap-talks per se, since there is no cost for sending or receiving messages, neither is there
any enforcement or punishment associated with the contents of communication. Results of
this paper show that communication is a cost-efficient way to promote cooperation between
individuals.
Although messages exchanged in the Fixed-message treatment and the Free-message
treatment deliver the same information on subjects’ intentions and future moves, com-
munication is essentially different in these two treatments in terms of reducing the social
distance between subjects. Those predetermined messages in the Fixed-message treatment
are sufficient in delivering information; however, these short and straightforward messages
are less likely to immediately reduce the social distance between strangers as free chatting
does. It is not only the information delivered, but also the social distance that enhances
cooperation between individuals. Comparison between the No-message no noise treatment
and the Free-message no noise treatment also reveals the same strong treatment effect of
free communication. When subjects can communicate freely, they cooperate significantly
more. Besides, it will be interesting to analyze subject chatting histories in the Free-message
treatment. Conversation histories can be coded and matched with subject intentions and
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realized outcomes, which allows us to determine the impact of any inconsistency between
what subjects has claimed in sent messages and the real outcomes.
Results show that other factors such as subject characteristics also influence subject deci-
sions (see Table 1.5). Older male students are slightly more cooperative. This finding is dif-
ferent from Gneezy et al. 2003, Croson and Gneezy 2009, and Niederle and Vesterlund 2005,
where the authors state that females cooperate more often compared to male participants;
however, this finding is in accordance with Price 2010. It is also found that economic-major
undergraduates are 2.21% more likely to cooperate compared to non-economic majors, but
this is based on a very small sample size of economic-major students.
D. Do subjects learn to cooperate over time?
This experiment design allows us to explore if subjects learn to cooperate over time. A
fixed-effect model is adopted to test whether previous partner’s decision at the beginning of
the match affects subject’s own decision of the current match, both controlling for individual
fixed-effect and time fixed-effect. Results show that if the other party has cooperated in the
first round of the previous match, then subjects are more likely to cooperate at the beginning
of the current match. In other words, cooperation is transmissible between subjects. A
cooperative individual has a positive influence on the people he or she has interacted with.
Since individuals learn and update their information about the subject pool during the
experiment, a cooperative subject is likely to influence others and make the entire subject
pool more cooperative. Table 1.6 shows that learning is significant for all the treatments
with noise, especially in the Free-message treatment.
Besides learning over matches, subjects also adjust their decisions within a match ac-
cording to the realized outcomes in previous rounds and the communication factors. For the
No-message treatment, the following model was constructed to test subject learning within
a match:
Yivt = α + β1Y−iv(t−1) + β2Y−iv(t−2) + β3Y−iv(t−1)Y−iv(t−2) + ivt (1.1)
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Table 1.6: Previous partner’s decision on subject’s own decision
VARIABLES Subject choice in the 1st round of the current match
(1) No msg. (2) Fixed msg. (3) Free msg.
Partner’s choice in
the 1st round of the previous match 0.335*** 0.450*** 1.079***
(0.103) (0.168) (0.324)
Constant -0.711*** -0.904*** 0.121
(0.219) (0.260) (0.199)
Observations 280 280 200
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Yivt is a binary variable that denotes subject i’s choice in the t
th round of the vth match.
Yivt = 1 if subject chooses to cooperate, and Yivt = 0 if subject chooses to defect. Y−iv(t−1)
and Y
−iv(t−2) denote subject i’s partner’s realized choices in the (t−1)
th and (t−2)th rounds
of the vth match. Y
−iv(t−1)Y−iv(t−2) is the interaction term. ivt is the error term. There is
no communication in this treatment.
For the Fixed-message treatment, Model (1.1) is modified as follows:
Yivt = α + β1Y−iv(t−1) + β2Y−iv(t−2) + β3Y−iv(t−1)Y−iv(t−2) + β4messageivt
+β5partnermessageivt + ivt
(1.2)
Compare to Model (1.1), Model (1.2) contains two communication factors, messageivt
and partnermessageivt. messageivt denotes subject i’s message sent in the t
th round of
the vth match, and partnermessageivt denotes subject i’s message received from his or her
partner in the tth round of the vth match. Both messageivt and partnermessageivt are
dummy variables which equal to 1 if the cooperative message “ I will choose A” is sent or
received, and equal to 0 if the non-cooperative message “ I will choose B” is selected.
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In the Free-message treatment, a communication variable communication is added to
the baseline Model (1.1):
Yivt = α + β1Y−iv(t−1) + β2Y−iv(t−2) + β3Y−iv(t−1)Y−iv(t−2) + β4communicationv + ivt (1.3)
where communicationv = 1 if subject i has sent at least one messages and also has received
at least one message in the first three rounds of the vth match; otherwise, communicationv
=0.
Results from Table 1.7 show that in the No-message treatment, subject decision in the
current round is affected by partner’s realized choice in the previous round. For example, if
a subject observes that his partner has defected in the previous round, he is more likely to
respond with defection in the current round, regardless of partner’s intended choice in the
previous round. Table 1.8 shows that in the Fixed-message treatment, partner’s realized
choices in the previous two rounds, message sent in the current round, and message received
in the current round all influence subject decision in the current round. If a subject observes
that his partner has cooperated in the previous two rounds, he is more likely to respond
that with cooperation. If a subject sends a cooperative message, he is more likely to act
accordingly. If a subject receives a cooperative message, he is more likely to respond with
cooperation as well. In the Free-message treatment, a subject considers both the partner’s
realized choice in the previous round and communication when making a decision for the
current round. Outcomes in round t − 2 no longer effect subject decision in round t. If a
group has communicated at the beginning of the match, they tend to cooperate more during
the match.
In sum, subjects do not recall outcomes in more than one previous rounds when mak-
ing their decisions in the current round when communications is allowed. Communication
increases the likelihood of cooperation.
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Table 1.7: Subject choice in the No-message Treatment
VARIABLES subject choice in round t
(1) (2)
partner’s realized choice in round (t− 1) 0.411*** 0.532***
(0.131) (0.130)
partner’s realized choice in round (t− 2) 0.168
(0.203)
interaction term 1.937***
(0.231)
Constant -1.274*** -1.733***
(0.189) (0.165)
Observations 4,480 4,160
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.8: Subject choice in the Fixed-message Treatment
VARIABLES subject choice in round t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
partner’s realized choice in round (t− 1) 0.393*** 0.437** 0.409*** 0.475**
(0.135) (0.213) (0.132) (0.226)
partner’s realized choice in round (t− 2) 0.248** 0.404***
(0.123) (0.156)
message sent in round t 2.041*** 1.880***
(0.314) (0.320)
message received in round t 0.779*** 0.522*
(0.296) (0.305)
interaction term 1.434*** 1.259***
(0.206) (0.153)
Constant -1.261*** -2.463*** -1.613*** -2.614***
(0.151) (0.335) (0.148) (0.335)
Observations 4,480 1,596 4,160 1,454
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Subject choice in the Free-message Treatment
VVARIABLES subject choice in round t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
partner’s realized choice in round (t− 1) 0.448*** 0.412*** 0.386*** 0.366***
(0.104) (0.101) (0.109) (0.106)
partner’s realized choice in round (t− 2) 0.202 0.177
(0.136) (0.136)
communication 1.409*** 1.073***
(0.211) (0.204)
interaction term 1.215*** 1.092***
(0.108) (0.112)
Constant -0.0499 -1.279*** -0.531*** -1.421***
(0.113) (0.216) (0.146) (0.234)
Observations 3,280 3,280 3,040 3,040
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.5 Conclusion
This paper designs a laboratory experiment to examine what factors influence individ-
ual decision when there is a conflict between private interests and mutual benefits. This
research studies how communication shapes individual cooperation. The experiment design
of this paper includes three features of human interaction: a noisy environment, an indef-
inite length of interaction, and communication. Results of this research reveal that people
are less cooperative in a noisy environment. Also, subjects learn to cooperate over time
and adjust their decisions according to the realized outcomes. Moreover, various levels of
communication affect subject decision differently. When subjects cannot communicate with
each other, they are less likely to cooperate. They behave in the same way with limited
communication. Only free communication significantly increases cooperation. Results of
this study provide a new perspective on the role of communication in promoting economic
efficiency in a noisy environment. It is not the information exchanged, but rather the free
communication itself, which reduces the social distance between individuals, that promotes
26
and retains cooperation.
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Chapter 2
Double-edged Sword: A Field
Experiment on Public Recognition and
Individual Charitable Giving
2.1 Introduction
Charities and non-profit organizations (NPOs) play an important role in providing public
goods and services in our society. In the year of 2012, all charitable and nonprofit organi-
zations of the US received 316 billion dollars, which was about 2% of its GDP. Specifically,
71% of these total amount comes from individuals and households. Comparatively, the to-
tal amount received by all charitable and non-profit organizations in China was 13 billion
dollars, which was only 0.16% of the nation’s GDP, and the majority comes from corporate
donations. Researchers and organizers of charities and NPOs are seeking cost-benefit effi-
cient ways to increase individual charitable giving. Various approaches have been adopted to
attract more donors (increasing the extensive margin) and elicit more donations (increasing
the intensive margin), such as recognizing donors through social medias.
Numerous studies focus on the motivations behind individual charitable giving. Accord-
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ing to Ariely et al. 2009 and Soetevent 2011, people donate to charitable and non-profit
organizations because of (1) the intrinsic motivation, such as pure altruism and inequality
aversion, as people care for others’ well-being, (2) the extrinsic motivation, which refers to
the material rewards people receive from giving, and (3) the image motivation, or reputa-
tion motivation, which implies that people care about their images perceived by others and
themselves. Extensive works have been done on examining the image motivation. Becker
1974 claims that an individual may donate more desiring to improve his reputation. Glazer
and Konrad 1996 state that an individual may use his donation as a signal of his generos-
ity, wealth, or both. Therefore, people tend to donate more when their donations can be
observed by the public. Harbaugh 1998 also claims that public recognition is an important
reason for people to donate. Moreover, public recognition is the only channel for individuals
to gain prestige through donating. Benabou and Tirole 2006 further extend the theory by
analyzing the interactions of the three motivations of giving in the image signaling frame-
work. They find that an individual’s concern on his image increases with the visibility of
his action. These findings have been confirmed in various laboratory and field experiments.
For example, Andreoni and Petrie 2004 find that when subjects’ identities and donations
are revealed, their group contribution to public goods increases by 59%. In their fundraising
experiment sessions, the authors find that most of their subjects choose to have their contri-
butions recognized when they are offered the chance. Other experimental studies also show
that people behave more prosocially when their identities are released to the public. For
example, people are more generous in giving their time or money (Soetevent 2005, Linardi
and McConnell 2011, Reinstein and Riener 2012, and Karlan and McConnell 2012). Like-
wise, when people behave prosocially, they prefer to be perceived as doing the good deed for
the society rather than for other reasons, such as for material rewards and benefits (Ariely
et al. 2009, Lacetera and Macis 2010).
In previous laboratory experiment studies (such as Andreoni and Petrie 2004, Karlan
and McConnell 2012, and Reinstein and Riener 2012) and field experiment studies (such
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as Soetevent 2005 and Linardi and McConnell 2011), increased public recognition is always
observed with a higher level of individual giving. In these experiments, anonymity is hard
to attain: either information disclosure on subjects’ identities or/and donations were re-
quired regardless of their donation decisions, or it was hard to remain anonymous in a small
laboratory environment when everyone else chose to be recognized, or it was impossible for
subjects to hide their identities or donations when their actions were observed by others in
a field experiment. Therefore, in these current studies, the underlying assumption for pub-
lic recognition resulting in higher individual donation is that subjects cannot opt out from
public recognition. This is a crucial assumption because if public recognition is optional,
we expect people behave differently. For example, those who prefer not to be recognized,
or those whose image motivation outweighs their intrinsic motivation will give less, or they
will choose not to give.
This paper intends to study the full scope of the effects of public recognition and in-
formation disclosure on individual charitable giving. Particularly, we are interested in the
research question of what kind of institution fosters individual giving in China. According
to a comparative study on nonprofit sectors across nations conducted by the John Hop-
kins Center for Civil Society Studies Center 2004, higher tax rates and better social benefit
programs are negatively related to the rate of individual giving in developed countries. In
European countries with better social benefit programs, although their individual donations
were lower compared to that of the United States, people were more interested in other forms
of giving such as volunteering. China, as a developing country that has been experiencing
major social transformations in recent decades, encouraging charitable giving and promot-
ing individual donation become more and more important nowadays. Also, this paper aims
to add to a small number of literature studying individual donation on east Asian countries.
The unique oriental culture may shape individuals’ attitudes towards donating and public
recognition, which leads to distinct results obtained with subjects in the western world. To
best answer our research question, we conducted a field experiment at Zhejiang University in
30
China. Subjects were randomly recruited and assigned into one of the five treatments with
distinct information disclosure schemes. We find that public recognition affects individual
giving in two opposite ways. On the one hand, subjects donate significantly more when
they realize that they will be publicly recognized. On the other hand, public recognition
lowers participation rate when subjects can avoid it by not donating. Approximately 1/3
of our subjects in those treatments with optional public recognition chose not to give and
not being recognized. In another treatment where subjects were offered the chance to be
publicly recognized after they donated, only 18% of them accepted this offer. 82% of the
subjects chose not to be recognized, especially those whose donations were relatively small.
In sum, public recognition is a “double-edged sword” towards individual charitable giving.
This result provides practical values and policy implications for charities and NPOs.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design.
Section 3 provides the results. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Experiment Design
We conducted a field experiment at Zhejiang University of China in November 2013 and
March 2014. This experiment was part of a fundraising event associated with the China
Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA)1, aiming to support elementary and middles
schools in rural areas of China. All our appliances used for this experiment, such as posters,
donation boxes, subject information cards, etc. carried the official logo of CFPA.
We choose to conduct this study as a field experiment in China for several reasons.
First, since this research aims to help promoting individual donations and provide practi-
cal insights for charitable organizations in China, obtaining subjects’ data from the field
is a better way pf learning and understanding individual behaviors in real lives. Second,
1China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, founded in March 1989, is the largest and most influential
non-profit organization specializing in poverty alleviation in China. For more details, please visit its official
website: http://www.fupin.org.cn.
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comparing to a laboratory experiment setting, a field experiment provides a larger environ-
ment where subject anonymity is possible. Moreover, China provides a unique background
for conducting this field experiment, since mandatory public recognition is widely used for
fundraising in schools, government and public sectors.
In this field experiment, we constructed an endowment earning stage and a donation elic-
iting stage. In the endowment earning stage, subjects were randomly recruited to complete
a survey on their career plans. We also asked for personal information in this survey, such
as subject’s age, gender, major, family income, number of siblings, etc., but we did no ask
any question relating to charity giving. It took a typical subject about 5 minutes to finish
this survey, and each subject was paid 30 yuan 2 in cash upon completion. In the donation
eliciting stage, subjects were introduced to the CFPA fundraising program and were offered
an opportunity to contribute. We separated the survey site and the fundraising site far away
from each other. Subjects did not know these two stages were related, and neither did they
know that they were participating in an experiment. Subjects were able to donate in private
in a divided donation area. We also provided envelopes and used non-transparent donation
boxes, in order to protect subject privacy if they preferred to be anonymous donors.
We enrolled 12 experimenters and trained them before the experiment. We divided them
into 3 teams, and each team had a recruiter, a surveyor, a cashier, and a fund solicitor. Their
duties were clearly divided: the recruiter was responsible for randomly recruiting subjects.
The surveyor was responsible for answering any question a subject might have during the
survey period. The cashier was responsible for handling subject payments. The fund solicitor
was responsible for introducing the fundraising program to subjects. To best eliminate the
experimenter’s effect on subjects (List and Price 2009), we selected experimenters with
similar age and sex for the same role. Each team recruited a balanced number of subjects
for each treatment. We assigned 5 subjects successively into one treatment before switching
to another.
2The minimum hourly wage of the city was 12 yuan at that time. The purchasing power of this 30 yuan
was approximately equal to three meals of a day at the university school cafeteria.
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We gave subjects envelopes to put their cash donations. These envelopes were numbered
on the inside, allowing us to tie donations to subjects’ characteristics that we gathered
from the surveys. We designed five treatments with distinct public recognition schemes
and varied the timing when we offered chances of public recognition. Treatment 1 was
the Donation-only Treatment ($-only). Before donating, subjects were told that only their
donations would be released to the public. Their names would not be released. Treatment 2
was the Name-only Treatment (Name-only). Before donating, subjects were told that they
would be publicly recognized if they donate. Only their names would appear but not their
donations. Subjects were offered blank cards to write their names. If a subject did not
wish to be recognized, he could donate zero and leave the card blank. Treatment 3 was the
Public Recognition with Opt-in Treatment (PR-in). Subjects in this treatment first made
their donations without knowing that they would be recognized. After donating, subjects
were provided the chance of public recognition. If a subject would like to be recognized, he
or she needed to write both name and donation amount on the card provide. Otherwise,
the subject only needed to write down the donation amount. It is noteworthy that although
subjects were provided the chance of public recognition after donation, they were not able
to make any changes in their donation. Treatment 4 was the Public Recognition with
Opt-out Treatment (PR-out). Subjects in this treatment were notified before making their
donations that they would be publicly recognized if they donate. If they chose to donate,
they needed to write their names on the cards provided. Otherwise, they could donate zero
and leave the card blank. Subjects in the PR-out treatment expected public recognition if
they donated. The only way to opt out from public recognition was not donating. Compare
to that, subjects in the PR-in treatment were anonymous donors when they donated. They
could opt in for public recognition after they donated. Treatment 5 was the Mandatory
Public Recognition Treatment (Mandatory-PR). In this treatment, regardless of how much
subjects donate (including zero), their names and donations would be released to the public.
Table 2.1 summarizes these five treatments.
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Table 2.1: Treatments
Treatment Information Released Public Recognition
$-only Donation only Not available
Name-only Name only Optional, offered before donation
PR-in Both donation and name Optional, offered after donation
PR-out Both donation and name Optional, offered before donation
Mandatory PR Both donation and name Mandatory, offered before donation
We can analyze treatment effects by comparing between treatments using the difference-
in-difference approach. First, if we compare the PR-out Treatment and the Name-only
Treatment, we can obtain the treatment effect on releasing subject donation amount to
public. Likewise, if we compare the PR-out Treatment and the Donation-only ($-only)
Treatment, we can get the treatment effect on releasing subject names to public. Our
assumption is that since subjects are driven by their reputation motivation, releasing subject
names will increase donation, while only releasing subject donation amount will have no
effect on donation. By comparing the Donation-only Treatment and PR-in Treatment, we
are able to analyze the post-donation public recognition information such as who would
opt-in for recognition and their donation amount. Also, we can examine the effect of public
recognition on individual donation by comparing across treatments. In the Donation-only
and PR-in Treatments, subject are anonymous donors at the moment of donation, while in
the Name-only and PR-out Treatments, subjects know that they will be recognized at the
moment of donation. By analyzing subject donation amount and participation rate, we are
able to investigate the how public recognition influences individual donation behavior.
We used the Zhejiang University Bulletin Board System, the 98 Forum, as a platform to
recognize our donors. The 98 Forum is the university official and the most popular campus-
wide social network among students, faculty, and staff at the Zhejiang University3. All of
our subjects knew about the 98 Forum, and most of them were registered members. In
those treatments where public recognition was available, subjects were informed that their
names, or donations, or both would be published on 98 Forum in the following month after
3As of May 12, 2014, this forum has 199,328 registered members.
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donation.
2.3 Results
We obtained 262 observations from this field experiment. Table 2.2 provides some sum-
mary statistics. In this table, it shows that the Mandatory PR treatment has the highest
average donation of 17.35 yuan. This number is significantly higher compared to those in
other treatments4. The average donations in the rest of the treatments are not statistically
different from each other5. Also, the Mandatory PR treatment has the highest participation
rate of 93.02%, and the highest average donation from contributed subjects of 18.65 yuan.
These results indicate that people are highly influenced by their reputation concern
when donating. This finding leads to our first result that public recognition leads to higher
participation rate and larger donation. It is consistent with what was found in previous
researches, where public recognition significantly increases individual donations when it is
mandatory.
Result 1. Public recognition encourages individual donation, especially when information
disclosure is mandatory.
We divide these five treatments into two categories according to subjects’ status when
making donations. In the $-only and PR-in treatments, subjects were anonymous donors be-
cause public recognition either was unavailable, or was offered after subjects donated. In the
other three treatments, subjects knew that they would be recognized before they donated.
This difference in subject’s status leads to some interesting results. Figure 2.1 shows the
4The average donation of the Mandatory PR treatment is higher than the $-only, Name-only, PR-in, and
PR-out treatment with p-values of p < 0.0021, p < 0.0020, p < 0.0001, and p < 0.0068, respectively. All
reported p-values in this section are based on the two-tailed Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test.
5The average donation of the $-only treatment is not statistically different compared to the Name-only,
PR-in and PR-out treatment, with p < 0.8540, p < 0.9845, and p < 0.8445, respectively. The average
donation of the Name-only treatment is not statistically different compared to the PR-in and PR-out
treatments, with p < 0.8299 and p < 0.9674, respectively. The average donation of the PR-in treatment is
not statistically different compared to the PR-out treatment, with p < 0.8085.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Treatment $-only Name-only PR-in PR-out Mandatory PR
# of subjects 43 49 78 49 43
Avg. donation 11.05 11.22 10.88 11.63 17.35
(10.03) (11.62) (10.20) (11.83) (9.91)
# of contributed subjects 35 34 66 32 40
Participation rate 81.40% 69.36% 84.62% 65.31% 93.02%
Avg. donation of
contributed subjects 13.75 16.18 12.86 17.81 18.65
(9.44) (10.66) (9.87) (10.16) (8.99)
# of recognized subjects - 34 12 32 41
Donations are in Chinese yuan (CNY). The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
average donation of contributed subjects and the participation rate for all the treatments as
two categories. First, for those subjects who contributed, their average donations are higher
in those treatments where public recognition is offered before donation.6 Second, Within
each category, there is no statistical difference between the average donations of contributed
subjects.7
Figure 2.1 also show the subject participation rate in each treatment.8 It shows that
only 69.36% and 65.31% of subjects contributed in the Name-only and PR-out treatments,
respectively. These participation rates are relatively low compared to those in the other
category. To further analyze the relationship between subject particiaption decision and
the choice of public recognition, we run a probit regression with donation decision as the
dependent variable on various explanatory variables. The results are described in Table 2.3.
We find that subjects are 18.84% less likely to donate in the Name-only treatment
6The average donation of those contributed subjects in the $-only treatment is statistically lower com-
pared to those in the Name-only treatment (p < 0.1985), PR-out treatment (p < 0.0600), and Mandatory PR
treatment (p < 0.0082). The average donation of those contributed subjects in the PR-in treatment is sta-
tistically lower compared to those in the Name-only treatment (p < 0.0619), PR-out treatment (p < 0.0123),
and Mandatory PR treatment (p < 0.0004) as well.
7The average donation of contributed subjects are not statistically different between the Name-only and
PR-out treatments (p < 0.4281), the Name-only and Mandatory PR treatments (p < 0.1220), as well as
the PR-out and PR treatments (p < 0.5890). The average donation of contributed subjects in the $-only
treatment is not statistically different from that of the PR-in treatment (p < 0.6708).
8Subject participation rate = number of contributed subjects / number of total subjects of the treatment.
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Figure 2.1: Average donation of contributed subjects and participation rate in each treat-
ment by category
$13.75
81.4%
$12.86
84.62%
$16.18
69.36%
$17.81
65.31%
$18.65
93.02%
Subjects as anonymous donors
$−only PR−in Name−only PR−out PR
Ave. donation of contributed donors Participation rate
Subjects as recognized donors
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Table 2.3: Probit regression of donation dummy on explanatory variables
Sample: Full
Mean of Dep. Var. for Omitted Treatment: 0.7901
(1)
Independent variables Marginal effect Coefficient s.d.
Treatment
$-only 0.0300 -0.1079 (0.2945)
Name-only -0.1884** -0.6766** (0.2847)
PR-out -0.1355*** -0.4867*** (0.2678)
Mandatory PR 0.1217 0.4369 (0.3263)
Session time X
Subject characteristics X
# of observations 253
Pseudo R2 0.0852
p-value 0.0184
Wald χ2 24.32
We use PR-in treatment as the baseline. We use weighted sample regression since there are more
observations in the PR-in treatment. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. * Significant at the 10% level.
compared to the PR-in treatment, and this result is significant at 5% level. Also, subjects
are 13.55% less likely to donate in the PR-out treatment compared to the PR-in treatment,
and this result is significant at 1% level. This implies that subject participation is affected
by their donation status. If subjects know that they will be recognized before donation,
some of them would rather not donate in order to opt out from public recognition. In
other words, subject participation rate is lower in those treatments where regocnition is
offered before donation and optional, since subjects who prefer to be anonymous opt out.
Furthermore, result of the Fisher’s exact test shows that subject participation rate in the
Name-only treatment is not statistically different from that in the PR-out treatment.9 This
implies that subject participation is affected by information disclosure on identity rather
than donation. These findings lead to our second result.
Result 2. Public recognition discourages individual participation in charitable giving,
9Fisher’s exact=0.830.
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especially when individuals can opt out from identity disclosure by not donating.
As opposed to previous researches where public recognition is found to increase donation
unanimously, we reveal that public recognition crowds out potential donors who prefer
to be anonymous. Compare to previous findings such as in Andreoni and Petrie 2004
where most subjects opt in for public recognition, we observed that the majority of donors
preferred to stay anonymous. We recruited 78 subjects in the PR-in treatment in order to
get more observations on recognized subjects in this treatment. However, only 12 out of 66
contributed subjects opt in for public recognition. About 82% of the subjects who made a
donation in this treatment chose to remain anonymous.
We attempt to characterize those donors who stayed anonymous in the PR-in treatment
and analyze the reasons behind that. One possible explanation is due to the unique oriental
culture on attitudes towards public recognition. Oriental culture values modesty and believes
that a good deed done anonymously deserves to be praised twice. Therefore, subjects prefers
to stay anonymous in order to be perceived as caring about others and doing the good deed
itself, which is superior, rather than as gaining personal reputation. More importantly, we
find that the average donation was 11.43 yuan for the group of subjects who chose to remain
anonymous, compared to that of 15.50 yuan of those who opt in for public recognition.10
Figure 2.2 provides additional information on subjects’ donation between anonymous donors
and recognized donors in the PR-in treatment. We categorized them as Low, Medium,
and High amount donors according to their donations. For those subjects who chose to
remain anonymous, 70.69% donated less than 10 yuan (Low), 17.24% donate 11-20 yuan
(Medium), and 12.07% donate more than 20 yuan (High). For those subjects who opt in for
public recognition, these percentages were 50.00%, 16.67%, and 33.33%, respectively. One
explaination of this observation is that subjects have their own believes on how much is a
high or a low donation, and these home-grown believes vary by individuals. For example,
five yuan may be considered as a high amount of donation for one individual while the same
10The sample size did not allow further economics analysis.
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Figure 2.2: Donation of the PR-in treatment
50%
24.39%
25.61%
Donation <=10 Donation >10 and <=20
Donation > 20
Subjects remained anonymous
27.27%
18.18%
54.55%
Donation <=10 Donation >10 and <=20
Donation > 20
Subjects opt in for recognition
amount may be considered as a low donation by another. Therefore, we observe subjects
whose giving were in the low category (below 10 yuan) and still chose to be recognized, as
well as subjects whose giving were in the high category (above 20 yuan) and chose not to be
recognized. However, as the absolute amount of donation increases, more and more people
are going to consider it as a high amount. Hence, we observed the tendency that subjects
with relatively small donations were more likely to stay anonymous, while subjects with
relatively higher donations were more likely to opt in for public recognition.
Since public recognition was offered after subjects donated, participants in the PR-
in treatment were not motivated by their image or reputation concern when donating.
However, image motivation affects subject decision on whether they choose to be publicly
recognized or not. When donors are required to release their information, those who might
have donated if they could remain anonymous opt out, especially for those who would have
donated a small amount. One explanation of this is that people are more likely to remain
anonymous if they believe their donation is not high enough to improve their reputation,
if not to harm it. In general, a larger amount of donation is more socially preferred and
associated with generosity, wealth, altruism, etc. However, people have their own believes
on what is the socially preferred level of donation. In our experiment, we did not discover
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a strong correlation between the amount of donation and the choice of public recognition.
However, there was a tendency that people who donated a larger amount were more likely
to opt in for public recognition. These findings lead to our third result.
Result 3. Public recognition crowds out small donations from potential donors who prefer
staying anonymous.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
We conducted a field experiment in China to study the full scope of the impact of pub-
lic recognition on individual charitable giving. We designed five treatments with distinct
schemes of public recognition and information disclosure. We find that mandatory pub-
lic recognition, in which case donor’s personal information is released to public regardless
of donation decision, leads to the highest contributes from donors and participation rate,
comparing to all other treatments. We also find that public recognition is a “double-edged
sword” on individual donation. On one hand, public recognition encourages individual do-
nation. On the other hand, public recognition crowds out small donations and lowers the
participation rate when people are able to avoid it by not donating. Results of this pa-
per reveals the rationale behind the commonly accepted form of donation with mandatory
public recognition in schools, governments and other public sectors China. It also suggests
that charitable organizations should adopt public recognition if the goal is to elicit larger
contributes from a single donor, but should avoid public recognition if they plan to attract
more donors. These results offer some insights for charitable and non-profit organization as
well as for policy makers.
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Chapter 3
Linking Principal Time Use to Student
Performance
3.1 Introduction
According to a national-wide report on educational effectiveness of K-12 schools, in the
state of Georgia, the overall student academic achievement was 5% below the national aver-
age in year 2014. Despite recent improvements, the state still performed poorly in terms of
its credibility of student proficiency scores and student college and careers readiness (Hess
and Oldham 2014). Considering these facts as well as records from previous reports, im-
proving school outcomes and transforming its public school education system have become
increasingly important for the state of Georgia. In fact, Georgia has participated in the
Race to the Top (R2T) program, legislated by President Obama as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which goals includes encouraging educa-
tional innovation and reform, improving student achievement and school outcomes, closing
educational gaps, increasing high school graduation rates, and preparing students for col-
lege and careers. As part of this R2T program, the Georgia Department of Education has
lauched the state’s Teacher Keys Effectiveness System (TKES), Leader Keys Effectiveness
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System (LKES), and Professional Keys Effectiveness System (PKES), aiming to support
school teachers, principals, and staff professional growth, with the ultimate goal of enhanc-
ing student learning. Based on these state evaluation systems, Fulton County Schools (FCS)
in Georgia piloted its new teacher evaluation system in the 2010-2011 school year. In the
following school year, the county introduced the rest of the new evaluation systems of LKES
and PKES to its school leaders and staff. At the beginning of the 2012-2013 school year,
Fulton County Schools officially adopted all the three new evaluation systems issued by the
state as guidelines for its school teachers, principals, and staff.
Under this background, we conducted a principal motion study with Fulton County
Schools in Fall 2012 and Spring 2013. We had a team of researchers follow 30 principals of
public schools in Fulton County, Georgia, including elementary, middle, and high schools
from four learning communities. We shadowed each principal for two full work days, and
recorded principal activities at five-minute intervals. We logged the nature of principals’
activities, locations where these activities occurred, and whom principals were interact-
ing with at that moment. We then nested and coded principals’ activities into 10 broad
strands, including instructional leadership, school climate, planning and assessment, orga-
nizational management, human resources management, teacher/staff evaluation, profession-
alism, communication and community relations, personal, and travel, under the standards
on the Leader Keys Effectiveness System rubric. We complemented these first-hand obser-
vational data with school-level student performance data from state-standardized exams of
the Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT) and End of Course Tests (ECOT). By
conducting this research, we aim to understand the following questions:
1. What do principals do in a typical work day?
2. How do principals’ activities vary across different learning communities and by school
characteristics?
3. How does principals’ time use on different activities influence student performance?
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This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways: (1) it is the first study con-
ducted in public schools in Fulton County at Metro Atlanta, Georgia, analyzing the effect
of principal time use on student performance; (2) to the best of our knowledge, this study is
the first one to include principals from all levels of K-12 public schools in principal motion
studies; (3) this research takes advantage of the wide geometric and demographic variations
in four learning communities with distinct school characteristics. This research also con-
tributes to a small but growing number of literatures that utilize field observational data to
study how principals spend their time, and how various principal activities influence student
achievements. We find that principals have multiple roles as the head leader of a school,
and principals adjust their time spend on each leadership role according to their school and
student characteristics. Results of this research show that principals’ time spend on human
resource management, teacher and staff evaluation, school planning and assessment, as well
as professionalism are positively related to student performance, while principals time spend
on communication and community relation , and organization management are negatively
related to student outcomes. These results provide a practical guideline for Fulton County
school principals and principals from other districts, as well as for higher administrative
offices in order to support principals’ work .
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature
on principal’s leadership effect on school performance and student outcomes. Section 3
describes our data collection procedure and the methodology. Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 discusses the implication and limitation of this research and concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
A large volume of previous literatures studying school impact on student performance fo-
cuses on the teacher value-added, comparing and developing the teacher value-added model,
and/or uses student outcomes to evaluate teacher’s contribution (Aaronson et al. 2007,
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Rockoff 2004, Rothstein 2008, McCaffrey et al. 2009, Chetty et al. 2013, Jackson et al. 2014,
McCaffrey et al. 2004). In contrast, school principals’ influence on students has not yet
been fully discovered, although it is commonly agreed that principals significantly impact
student performance as well. Principals affect school and student outcomes both directly
and indirectly through their influences on other factors that affect student outcomes, such
as principal’s interaction and impact on teacher effectiveness (Leithwood et al. 1991, and
Witziers et al. 2003). For example, Coelli and Green 2012 showed that principal quality
and experience affected student graduation rate and English exam scores, using data from
grade 12 students of British Columbia, Canada. Dhuey and Smith 2014, using 4th to 7th
grade student math and reading scores from British Columbia, Canada, also confirmed that
principal quality had significant impact on student achievement. Moreover, they found that
better principal-school match increased student achievement by 0.17 standard deviation.
School principals affect student outcomes indirectly as well. For instance, Supovitz et al.
2009 showed that principals significantly facilitated student learning through the channel of
teacher’s practices, such as adding new curriculum, facilitating collaboration and communi-
cation, and doing other instructional-related works. Branch et al. 2012 found that principals
influenced student performance primary through the management of teacher force. Similarly,
Grissom et al. 2014 claimed that student performance was positively related with principal’s
time spent on school management. Besides, Leithwood et al. 1991 argued that principals
impacted school culture in a wide range from school programs and policies to teacher and
student behaviors. Böhlmark et al. 2012 claimed that principals were an important factor in
determining school policies and working conditions, and all these commonly-accepted school
policies, norms, values, and believes were essential in achieving student growth and school
development.
Principals considerably impact student performance and school outcomes from multiple
angles, because as the head leader, principals play various roles in school. Hallinger and
Heck 1998 summarized principal’s roles mainly as 1) having clear visions and missions, (2)
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building and maintaining school structure and networks, (3) leading, supporting, fostering
teachers and school staff, as well as managing and developing relationships with all other
stakeholders, and (4) building and sustaining good school culture. Waters et al. 2003 also
stated that it required multiple dimension from educational leaders to be effective. The
authors conceptualized a “balanced leadership framework.” They pointed out that principals
needed to know “what to do, when to do, how to do, and why to do,” and principals needed
to possess all the necessary knowledge, skills, strategies, resources, and tools in order to be
effective.
Since principal’s role contains multiple aspects, it is essential to ask which one is the
most influential to student performance and school outcomes. Few recent researches have
attempted to disentangle principal’s aggregated effect on student performance; however, it
is still unclear which aspect(s) of principal’s role is/are the most influential. For example,
Robinson et al. 2008 concluded from a meta-analysis that principal’s time spent on teacher’s
development had a strong effect on student outcomes, while time spent on school planning
and management and instructional management had moderate effects. Grissom et al. 2012
conducted a motion study with Miami-Dade County high-school principals, and found that
the overall instructional activities did not predict school effectiveness. Furthermore, in their
following studies of Grissom et al. 2013 and Grissom et al. 2014, they claimed that prin-
cipals’ time spent on instructional leadership did not, or even predicted a negative effect
on student performance. Walker et al. 2014 used data from 42 public secondary schools in
Hong Kong, and found that principals’s time spent on communication and network building
was positively correlated to student academic achievements. May et al. 2012 used principal
self-reported activity logs and paired them with 3-year longitudinal data on student out-
comes. They showed that more time spent on instructional leadership had no influence on
student performance across schools. However, principal’s time spent on financial manage-
ment and personal issues were positively related to student performance, and time spent
on school planning and instructional leadership had negatively impacts. Hence, there is no
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consensus on which role of the principal is most crucial in improving student performance.
One possible explanation of this non-consensus is that principal’s time use varies over time
and across schools, and principals adjust their activities according to school characteristics,
student body, and/or the day of observation. Therefore, we conducted our observations in
two semesters, in order to obtain the average time use by principals. We also analyzed our
observational data separately in four learning communities with various school characteris-
tics.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Principal Motion Study
We conducted a principal motion study with 30 public schools in Fulton County, Georgia
in fall semester 2013 and spring semester 2013. We randomly selected a total of 30 schools
based on three indicators. First, we categorized all public schools in the county into four
learning communities, Northwest, Northeast, Central, and South, since each learning com-
munity is geographically and demographically distinct from another. Second, we stratified
all public schools in the county into quintiles by their number of discipline referrals reported
in the previous school year of 2011-2012. Last, we balanced the number of elementary,
middle, and high schools in our sample to include 10 schools at each level. Based on these
three selection criteria, we chose a sample of 30 representing schools with a broad mix of
school settings, which allowed us to define more accurately how principals in the entire
county typically spend their time, as well as make valid comparisons among schools and
across different learning communities. We reached out to the principals from these selected
schools by emails first, and asked them if they were willing to participate in this academic
research. Principals were informed in this invitation email that this research was conducted
independently with the purpose of understanding how principals, as a group, use their time.
They were also notified that this research was not related to any of their performance evalu-
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ation. Neither would they receive any kind of reward or penalty if they chose to participate
in this study or not. Principals were allowed to withdraw from this study at any moment.
All 30 principals in our initial selection pool responded to our emails and voluntarily chose
to participate in this study.
We adopted the same procedure as Horng et al. 2010 in obtaining our observational
data. We shadowed the principals of these 30 schools for their entire work day, tracked
their activities, and determined their amount of time spent on different tasks. Principals
were instructed to ignore the researcher and perform as in their normal working day. Each
principal was shadowed by one of our researchers for two entire school days, one in Fall 2012
and the other in Spring 2013. Principal’s work day is defined as 30 minutes before students
arrive and 30 minute after students are dismissed. A typical work day is usually from 6:30
a.m. to 5 p.m., which usually begins and ends about 30 minutes earlier for elementary school
principals. We recorded principal activities at five-minute intervals. The protocol to record
principal activities was strictly limited to what the principal was doing or was about to do
at the exact moment when the second hand on the observer’s watch reached the five-minute
interval. Since principals shift their tasks very often, in order to make the data collection
process consistent, principal activities that occurred in between the five-minute intervals
were not recorded. Besides recording principal’s activity tasks, our researchers were also
required to log the location of the activities and the person(s) with whom principals were
interacting at the moment of recording. If a principal was multi-tasking at the moment of
recording, only the primary task was recorded. We referred to these information when we
coded principal activities afterwards. We physically followed and shadowed these principals
for most of their activities during their work days, expect if principals were addressing
personal matters, or if the nature of the activity was protected by privacy law. For example,
we did not participate in such meetings if a principal was talking with a teacher regarding
to his or her performance or HR evaluation, or if a principal was discussing with students
or parents regarding to specific issues about a student. In such cases, we waited for the
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principal outside of his or her office, and logged the principal activity in the same fashion
based on principal’s post-meeting feedback. For coding purpose, we asked principals to
provide information on the nature of those meetings without disclosing any details.
We categorized and coded principal’s tasks into 10 broad categories according to the na-
ture of the activities under the standards of the Leader Keys Effectiveness System (LKES)
rubric from the Georgia Department of Education. These 10 categories include instructional
leadership, school climate, planning and assessment, organizational management, human
resources management, teacher/staff evaluation, professionalism, communication and com-
munity relations, personal, and travel. Appendix F explains the LKES standards and each
of these categories in detail. If our researcher had a specific question about coding, the
instance would be brought up to the research group. A code would be assigned to that
specific activity with a consensus in the group discussion.
We believe that obtaining field data on principal time use is the best approach to learn
and understand how principals spend their work time. Yet, this approach has its own limi-
tations. First, this study did not capture principals’ time spent working outside their work
days, and it should be acknowledged that most principals work more than the standard 40
hours per week. Second, sometimes the job required the principals to multi-task. However,
for our data analyzing purpose, we only recorded the primary task. Third, although prin-
cipals were encouraged to share the contents with our researchers when they were working
on computers, not all information was disclosed. Our researchers did not make assumptions
on the nature of the task if principals decided not to share of their computer works, and
these time spent on undisclosed emails or computer work were grouped with other personal
activities such as eating, using bathrooms in the personal category. Therefore, it might lead
to an upward-bias on principals’ time spent on this category. Last but not least, although
principals were agreed to disregard our researchers and perform as usual, we could not com-
pletely rule out the possibility of any observer effect, in which principals might alter their
daily routine or the length of time spent on certain activity for any reason. To address
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this concern, we would recommend conducting a follow-up survey on principals’ believes on
which of their activities are more correlated to better student performance. We expect to
discover a higher discrepancy between self-reported believes and actual observed data for
those principals who performed their daily routine when observed, while a lower discrepancy
would be found for those principals who might potentially suffer from this observer effect.
This is because for those principals who had the incentive to alter their behaviors, they
would tend to put more effort into those activities that they believed will promote student
outcomes. Also, we assume that the chances of principals altering behaviors may be higher
in those schools with relatively poor student performance. If this study were replicated,
efforts should be made in addressing these above matters.
3.3.2 Student Performance Data
We complemented our observational data with student performance data from the Geor-
gia Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT) and the End of Course Tests (EOCT).
Both of these state-standard tests are widely adopted in educational literatures as assess-
ments of student performance. The CRCT are given to students from grade one through
eight, measuring specific skills that are essential for continuing academic progress in each
core subject such as math, reading, science, social studies, and English/language arts. The
EOCT are criterion-referenced tests adopted by all high schools in Georgia as part of the
College and Career Readiness Performance Index (CCRPI), and these tests include subjects
of 9th-grade literature and composition, physical science, and algebra. All these scores are
reported in percentages of students meets, exceeds, or do not meet the state’s expectations
by grade levels and subjects . These school-level student performance records can be found
on the website of Fulton County Schools, National and State Assessments 2015.
We used the CRCT scores of reading and math in 5th and 8th grades as assessments
for student performance in elementary and middle schools, respectively. For high schools,
we used EOCT scores of 9th grade literature and composition and algebra. Hence, we have
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two evaluation criteria for student outcomes, one on language and the other on math. We
obtained a longitudinal data of the 30 sample schools for two school years from 2012 to
2014. The mean value of the percentage of students meet or exceeds the expectation on
the language criterion was 93.14, with a standard deviation of 8.33. The mean value of the
percentage of students meet or exceeds the expectation on the math criterion was 70.98,
with a standard deviation of 28.81.
We also obtained school characteristics data for each sample school from Fulton County
School Accountability Office, including student gender, ethnicity, status on free or reduced
lunch program, status on special education needs, and student English proficiency level. We
treated these data as a series of binary variables. The gender dummy equals to 0 for male
students and 1 for female students. The race dummy equals to 0 for white students and 1
for students of all other races. We used student status on free or reduced lunch program as
a proxy of their family income, and that dummy variable equals to 1 if a student qualifies
for free or reduced lunch. The dummy variable of student status on special education needs
equals to 1 for students with disability and those who require special education needs. For
the dummy variable of student English proficiency, it equals to 1 if a student has limited
English proficiency, or is being monitored because of English proficiency, and it equals to
zero if a student is not eligible or no longer monitored. We regressed student performance
on math and language separately as functions of principal time use in a fixed effect model,
controlling for school characteristics. Results are presented in the next section. A limitation
of this method is that although we were able to identify the correlation between principal
activities and student performance, we were not able to determine the causality between
them. This is a common issued faced by this type of research, and it requires more advanced
econometric tools and theory support.
51
3.4 Results
3.4.1 What Do Principals Do in a Typical Work Day
By analyzing our observational data, we are able to answer the first research question
of how principals spend their time at work. In general, principals spent most of their time
at work, about 20.79%, on building and maintaining school climate, such as talking with
parents, students, teachers, and staff, and rewarding students. Principals’ time spent on in-
structional leadership ranked the second, which was about 15.92% of their total work time.
This category included all principal actitives realted to improving and developing school
curriculum, such as analyzing school achievement data, attending grade level meetings, and
identifying needs to design, revise, and monitor instruction, etc. Principals’ time spent on
human recourse manangement and teacher/staff evaluation ranked at the third and fourth
place among the 10 categories, respectively. This implied that another important aspect of
principal’s leardership role was organizing and managing school staff resources, addressing
employee concerns, evaluating and providing opportunities for employee advancement. On
average, principals spent similar amount of time on other categories, such as communica-
tion and community relation (establishing community partnerships), school planning and
assessment (developing school visions and plans), professionalim (personal professional de-
velopment), organizational management (managing school financial recources and facilities),
and the personal task (addressing personal issues), except for traveling to off-site meetings.
These results are presented in Figure 3.1.
3.4.2 How Do Principals’ Activities Vary by School Levels and
Learning Communities
To analyze how principals’ activities vary by school levels, we first separated the 30
schools into three groups according to their school levels. There were 10 schools in each
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - aggregated
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group at the elementary, middle, and high school levels. We found that principals spent
most of their time on building and maintaining school climate, and this was true for all school
levels. Especially, high school principals spent 24.75% of their work time on this task, while
elementary and middle school principals spent 18.26% and 19.90% of their time, respectively.
This implied that buidling school culture and maintaining good relaionship with school
employee, students and parents were an important aspect of principal’s leadership role for
all schools. The second largest amount of time spent was on the instructional leadership
task for elementary and middle school principals, with 14.88% and 19.23%, respectively. For
high school principals, this was the HR management task, which took 13.69% of their work
time. This implied that for lower level schools such as elementary and middle schools, being
an instruction learder was essential for principals, while managing school employee was a
heavier duty for high school principals. The third largest amount of time spent by elementary
principals was on teacher and staff evaluation, which was 14.75%. For middle and high
school principals, that was HR management (12.01%) and instructional leadership (13.55%),
respectively. All these findings showed that the three major roles for principals were building
school culture and climate, improving and developing curriculum, and mangaing school
emplyee resouces, although principals may vary the weight they put on these tasks acoording
to their school levels. Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3, and Figure 3.4 describe principals time spent
on each category at all three school levels.
Each public school in Fulton County belongs to a learning community based on their
geographic location, and each learning community has its distinct characteristics. Table 3.1
presents the summary statistics of the student body in our school samples by each learn-
ing community. It is noticeable that the Northwest Learning Community has the largest
percentage of white students, and has the lowest percentage of students qualified for free
or reduced lunch program. The Northeast and Central Learning Communities are with
higher percentages of minority students and students qualified for free or reduced lunch
program. In the South Learning Community, 99.29% of the students are non-white, and
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - elementary school
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - middle school
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - high school
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Table 3.1: Learning community summary statistics
Learning Female Non-white Free/Reduced Disability Limited
Community lunch English
Northeast 48.46% 50.14% 21.31% 8.85% 4.60%
Northwest 49.84% 35.76% 12.05% 8.00% 2.71%
Central 51.49% 58.65% 48.24% 6.72% 4.67%
South 49.98% 99.29% 83.90% 12.45% 0.94%
83.90% percent of students qualify for free or reduced lunch program.
We took advantage of this widely spread geographic range and diverse student demo-
graphics. To analyze how principals’ time spent on each activity varied by learning commu-
nities, we clustered our sample schools according to the learning communities they belonged
to. Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7, and Figure 3.8 describe principals time spent on each of
the ten categories in each learning community. We found that principals in different learning
communities had diverse patterns on how their time was used. Firstly, although principals
in all learning communities spent most of their time in activities related to building school
climate, principals of the Northeast Learning Community spent the largest of amount of
time in this category while principals of the Northwest Learning Community spent the low-
est, which were 23.93% and 17.71%, respectively. Secondly, instructional leadership ranked
the second highest category in principals’ time use for all learning communities expect in
the Northeast Learning Community, where HR management took 11.81% of principals’
work time. Thirdly, principals in different learning communities had various categories as
their third highest time spent category. For Northwest and Central Learning Communities,
teacher and staff evaluation took 14.32% and 11.36% of principals’ total work time, while
in Northeast and South Learning Communities these categories were instructional manage-
ment (11.15%) and HR mangangement (15.40%), respectively. Lastly, we noticed that none
of the principals in the South Learning Community traveled for any off-site meeting during
our two observational periods, while principals of all other learning communities did.
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - Northeast Learning Com-
munity
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - Northwest Learning Com-
munity
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - Central Learning Com-
munity
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of principal time spent on each category - South Learning Community
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3.4.3 How Does Principals’ Time Use Influence Student Perfor-
mance
We complemented our observational data with student performance data from the CRCT
and EOCT scores on math and language for all sample schools. We used student perfor-
mance as the dependent variable and principal time spent on each category as explanatory
variables, and controlled for school characteristics. Results in Table 3.2 show that principal
time spent on activity tasks related to instructional leadership, school climate, teacher and
staff evaluation, and community relations were associated with better student performance
in both subjects of math and language. Especially, principals’ time spent on school climate
and teacher and staff evaluation had the largest influence in improving student performance
on both tests, and these effects were significant at the 1% level. On the contrary, principal
time spent on organizational management and school planning and assessment were nega-
tively related to student performance in math and language tests. Principals’ time spent
on professionalism category had no significant impact on student math score, while it posi-
tively influenced student language test score. Principals’ time spent on personal issues had a
positive impact on student math score, but it did not influence student performance on lan-
guage test. Principals’ time spent on traveling had a mixed effect on student performance.
It was positively associated with student math score, but negatively associated with student
language score. These results implies that different principal leadership styles have various
influence on student outcomes. Especially, principals impact their school and student per-
formance in a way through building school culture and climate as well as accommodating
school employees.
3.5 Discussion
We conducted a principal motion study in Fulton County, Georgia and shadowed 30
school principals from all levels of public K-12 schools for two work days. We logged and
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Table 3.2: Effect of principal time use on student performance
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Math Language
Instructional Leadership 0.287*** 0.139***
(0.0924) (0.0304)
School Climate 1.432*** 0.593***
(0.148) (0.0488)
Teacher/Staff Evaluation 0.938*** 0.316***
(0.102) (0.0335)
HR Management 0.535*** 0.238***
(0.122) (0.0403)
Organizational Management -0.830*** -0.255***
(0.121) (0.0398)
Planning and Assessment -0.491*** -0.242***
(0.136) (0.0448)
Community Relations 0.286** 0.103**
(0.130) (0.0427)
Professionalism 0.0983 0.315***
(0.195) (0.0643)
Personal 0.773*** -0.0636
(0.150) (0.0494)
Travel 0.628** -0.336***
(0.301) (0.0991)
Constant -23.95* 58.52***
(11.97) (3.938)
Observations 60 60
R-squared 0.984 0.979
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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coded principals’ activities into 10 broad categories. We linked these observational data
with student performance data from state-wide CRCT and EOCT scores in subjects of
math and language. Results of this study show that (1) principal’s leadership role contains
multiple aspects, (2) principals’ time use varies among different school levels and school
characteristics, and (3) principals’ time spend on building and maintaining school culture
and school climate, as well as evaluating teachers and school staff are positively related to
student performance. These results suggest that principals should put their work focus on
building and maintaining a good school culture and school climate, as well as providing
opportunities for school employee development, which will ultimately improve and lead to
better student academic outcomes.
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Conclusion
This dissertation employs laboratory and field experiments to study factors and insti-
tutions in the real-world and their impacts on individual decision making. The first essay
utilizes a laboratory experiment that includes three factors in human interactions including
noisy environment, indefinite length of interaction, and various levels of communication to
analyze their impact on individual decision on cooperation. Results of this study show that
subjects are less cooperative in a noisy environment, and communication via fixed messages
is not a remedy for the low cooperation rate in such environment. Although free message
delivers similar contents of information on subject strategies, it leads to a distinct outcome
compared to communicating through fixed messages. Subjects are 32.2% more likely to
cooperate with their partners when they can communicate freely compared to no communi-
cation. Free communication not only increases cooperation between subjects significantly,
but also maintains the cooperation rate at a high level over time. Results from this study
also show that subject learn to cooperate over time. If a suject has interacted with a coop-
erative individual before, he or she is more likely to cooperate with other individuals at a
later time.
The second essay aims to answer the research question of what kind of institution par-
ticularly fosters individual giving in China. We conducted a field experiment with five
distinct public recognition treatments to investigate the effect of public recognition on in-
dividual charitable giving. Results of this study show that both the donation amount and
participation rate are significantly higher when we mandated recognition. However, public
recognition offered before donation crowds out small donations and thus lowers the partici-
pation rate. Results of this paper reveals the rationale behind the commonly accepted form
of donation with mandatory public recognition in schools, governments and other public
sectors in China. It also suggests that charitable organizations should adopt public recog-
nition if the goal is to elicit larger contributes from a single donor, but should avoid public
recognition if they plan to attract more donors.
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The third essay is based on a field experiment on principals’ time used and the impact
on student outcomes. Results of this study show that principal time spend on activity
tasks related to instructional leadership, school climate, teacher and staff evaluation, and
community relations are associated with better student performance in math and language.
Especially, principals’ time spend on school climate and teacher and staff evaluation have
the largest impacts. On the contrary, principal time spend on organizational management
and school planning and assessment are negatively related to student performance. Other
activities such as professionalism, personal, and traveling have undetermined effects on
student performance. These results imply that principals affect their school and student
performance in a more indirect way through building school culture and climate as well as
accommodating school employees.
On the whole, this dissertation employs laboratory and field experiments to study real
world phenomenons. Results of this dissertation aim to provide practical insights for indi-
viduals as well as for policy makers.
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Appendix A
Sample Experiment Instructions
The following are the experiment instructions used for Free-message Treatment. Instruc-
tions in the No-message and Fixed-message treatments are generally the same except in the
related part of communication.
Welcome
Thank you for participating in this decision-making experiment. Please read the follow-
ing instructions carefully.
No Talking Allowed
Once the experiment begins, you are not allowed to talk. If you have any question,
please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you to answer your question in
private. Also, usage of cell phone or other personal electronic devices is not allowed during
the experiment. Please turn off your cell phone now. Disruptive individuals will be asked
to terminate the experiment and leave the room.
General Instructions
1. This experiment contains a series of interactions between you and other participants
in the room.
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2. In each interaction, you will be randomly paired with another person for a sequence
of rounds. Each sequence of rounds is referred to as a match. You will be paired with
the same person during a match.
3. In each round, you and the person you are interacting with can choose one of two
options, A and B. These options and the corresponding payoffs are shown in the
screenshot on the next page.
This screen will appear on your computer at the beginning of each round. The table
on the left shows your payoff and table on the right shows the other person’s payoff.
For example, the table on the left indicates that if
- you select A and the other selects A, you make $0.6;
- you select A and the other selects B, you make 0;
- you select B and the other selects A, you make $1;
- you select B and the other selects B, you make $0.2.
The table on the right indicates that if
- you select A and the other selects A, the other makes $0.6;
- you select A and the other selects B, the other makes 1;
- you select B and the other selects A, the other makes 0;
- you select B and the other selects B, the other makes $0.2.
You have 60 seconds to make a decision in each round. The remaining time is shown
at the top right corner of your computer screen.
4. In each round, there is a 7/8 probability that the option you choose actually occurs.
However, with probability 1/8, your choice is changed to the opposite of what you
have selected. For instance, when you select A, there is a 7/8 chance that you will
actually play A, and 1/8 chance that instead you play B. The same is true for the
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other person. Whether your choice is reversed or not has nothing to do with the other
person’s choice being reversed or not. Notice that both you and the other person are
informed of the moves which actually occur. Neither of you is informed of the intended
choice of the other. Therefore when you observe the other person’s choice, remember
that with 1/8 probability this may not be that person’s intention.
5. There will be at least 8 rounds in each match. After the 8th round, there is a 7/8
chance that the match will continue for another round. For example, if you are in
rounds 1-7, it is certain that there will be a following round. If you are in round 8,
the probability that there will be a 9th round is 7/8, so is in round 9 and so on. The
number of current round is shown on the top left corner of your computer screen.
6. In each round, you are allowed to chat with the other person through the dialogue
window on the bottom left of your computer screen. Sending or receiving messages
has zero cost to you or the other person. Note that no foul or profane language shall
be used or you will be asked to terminate the experiment and leave the room.
7. Information such as your choice, whether your choice is implemented or not, what the
other person observes you choose, your observation of the other’s choice, your earnings
of each round and the match, the other person’s earnings of each round and the match
are presented to you at the bottom right of your computer screen.
8. Once a match ends, you will be randomly paired with a different person for a new
match.
Payments
What you earn in this experiment depends partly on your decisions, partly on the other
people’s decisions, and partly on chance. Please make sure you fully understand the instruc-
tions, which may help you earn more in this experiment. You will be paid in cash at the
end of this experiment. Your payment contains two parts. First, you will be paid $10 for
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showing up for this experiment. Second, you will be paid for what you have earned in the
experiment. At the end of this experiment, your earnings from one of the matches will be
randomly selected as your payment of the experiment. The exchange rate is: 1 experimental
dollars = 3 US dollars. Since your earning of any of the matches can be selected as your
payment for the experiment, you need to treat every match seriously.
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Appendix B
Demographic Statistics by Treatment
Treatment Female African American Average age
No msg. 37.5% 52.5% 21.7
Fixed msg. 52.5% 62.5% 20.5
Free msg. 52.5% 47.5% 20.7
No msg. no noise 70% 50% 20.6
Free msg. no noise 55% 50% 21.3
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Appendix C
Selected Subjects’ Messages in the
Free-message Treatment
Group 1.
Subject A: Hello.
Subject B: Hey.
Subject A: What are you picking? We both can’t get 1. To maximize our gains we should
both pick A.
Subject B: We should pick A every time cuz on average we will both get .6.
Subject A: Yup yup.
Subject B: Ok were on the same page. lol. A every time.
Group 2.
Subject A: I miss our team :(
Subject B: Me too.
Subject A: A?
Subject B: Communication is key. What are we going to pick?
Subject A: Both pick A.
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Subject B: Deal my love.
Subject A: Deal :)
Group 3.
Subject A: Sorry that was reversed.
Subject B: I pick b you pick a.
Subject A: Pick b and I’ll pick a.
Subject A: Yes.
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Appendix D
Selected Subjects Self-reported
Strategies
The post-experiment questionnaire included an open-ended question that asked for sub-
jects’ strategy or strategies used. Following are some of the subject responses.
1. No-message treatment.
• I choose option A to start because we both would earn .6 but once they switch to B i
do also.
• I usually tried to pick A so we both can get paid but if the other person choose B
often I would pick B.
• I chose A initially to try to get the other person to agree to choose A with me. My
strategy was to try to maximize both our payoffs to .6 each round. Unfortunately,
human nature always wants more.
• 2 As, then Bs until the other picks 2 As in a row, then A until the other picks 2 Bs in
a row.
• B, because no matter the other person’s option you would still get money
76
• I chose mostly B, and then I would chose A every few rounds. There was almost
always a chance to make some money with this pattern..
2. Fixed-message treatment
• I chose to sent the “I will choose A" option, and then proceeded to choose B. If the
other person believed me, then I would be rewarded one point. If they failed to believe
me, then I would still receive .2 points.
• Most people chose option B for at least the .2. I tried to manipulate participants by
saying I will choose A (to bait opponent choice A) and then choose B. But nobody
was having that -_-
• I chose option A because it made more money. I trust that the other person will
choose A too. If they lie then i will keep picking B
• I would ask the person first to go with A because of the fairness of the payout, but
if I would not get a response I would choose B in order to make sure I was covered,
meaning I would not lose points, like if I would of chose A.
• I chose A’s whenever the other person said they were also choosing A’s and continued
to do so. I chose B if there other person continued to chose B no matter what they
said, or they said they would chose B.
• I chose various options based on the response I got from the person prior to making
the final decision of each round. It was based on trust and if that person actually
chose the answer that they said they would choose.
• I started off choosing A to establish trust but when that was broken more than once
I resorted to B.
3. Free-message treatment
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• Mostly A because after discussing with the opponent, we realized that A would give
us both an equal and good payout. However, people cheat. So sometimes the answers
changed.
• I choses A because on average it maximized profit and because we got to speak to the
other person there was minimal risk.
• I tried my best to stick to us both choosing A. Both in mathematics and fairness, we
would both be better off that way. When the computer picked a different choice for
us, we tried to even out our payoffs.
• I discussed with the other person to either alternate so we would both get 1 point or
choose A so that we would get the .6. Sometimes I would just choose B to see if I got
the 1 point if the other person did not try to contact me
• I tried to stay even with my partner, but at times I got greedy and keep getting points
for myself.
• We both chose to do both A unless one of us got screwed with the reversing, then we
agreed to even it up and go back to both picking A.
• A and B, I tried to coordinate with the paired person so that we could both have a
nice amount of money at the end of the match.
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Appendix E
School Characteristics
Learning Community Elementary Middle High Total
Northeast 2 3 3 8
Northwest 3 2 2 8
Central 2 2 2 6
South 3 2 3 8
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Appendix F
Principal Activity Codes
Category Description
Instructional Leadership
Analyzing current academic achievement data
Attending PLC/Grade Level/Content Area meetings
Class/course scheduling
Discussing school activities with leadership team
Identifying needs to design, revise, and monitor instruction
Implementing instructional best practices
Improving inter-rater reliability with leadership
Teacher walkthroughs and observations
School Climate
Building relationships with parents
Building relationships with staff
Building relationships with students
Direct student supervision (lunch/hall/bus duty)
Managing school safety
Managing student discipline issues and policies
Recognizing/rewarding students
Setting/modeling school expectations and norms
Planning & Assessment
Assessing/responding to larger political context
Developing a vision/School Improvement Plan for the school
Identifying/assessing a child for special services
Planning interventions for an individual student
Program/curriculum development
Promoting opportunities for an individual student
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Category Description
Organizational Management
Managing existing school finances and resources
Managing school facilities
Trying to acquire new resources
HR Management
Addressing employee concerns
Managing staffing resources
Motivating/recognizing/rewarding staff
Planning/leading staff professional development
Providing opportunities for employee advancement
Recruiting/hiring/firing staff
Supervising staff (directive/corrective action)
Teacher/Staff Evaluation
Examining evidence of employee performance
Giving feedback to staff/coaching staff
Implementing new performance management tools
Sharing employee performance data with leadership team
Professionalism
Attending professional development
Attending district trainings, meetings, and events
Communicating/receiving expectations from the district
Networking with other principals/colleagues
Planning for the day/monitoring day’s agenda
Community Relations
Attending athletic events
Establishing community partnerships
Involving stakeholders in school initiatives
Planning athletic events/improving athletic program
Planning community/school events
Sharing information with stakeholders
Personal
Eating
Getting ready for next activity/preparing oneself
Personal phone call/managing personal schedule
Restroom
Undisclosed emails/computer work
Travel Travel to off-site meeting or event
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Appendix G
Map of Fulton County Learning
Communities
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